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Unintended Consequences of Welfare Reform: 
The Case of Divorced Parents
*
 
This paper formulates a model to examine the effects of changes in tax-benefit policy on the 
behavior of divorced parents and the well-being of children in single-parent households. 
Noncustodial parents choose the level of a child support payment to transfer to custodians. 
These, in turn, decide over child good expenditures and the allocation of time between 
market work and parenting. In general, ex-spouses fail to achieve an efficient allocation of 
their resources. On the custodial side, there are inefficiently high levels of labor supply and 
inefficiently low levels of expenditures on child goods, while on the noncustodial side child 
support payments are suboptimally low. Our results rationalize the adverse effects that 
welfare reforms might have on divorced parents and their children. Such adverse effects may 
arise because an increase in the custodian’s effective wage, either through lower marginal 
income tax rates or higher childcare subsidies, reinforces the inefficiencies of divorced 
parents’ decisions: that is, such an increase further depresses child support transfers from 
noncustodial parents and induces custodial parents to work even more. We explore several 
extensions of this model, link our findings to the existing empirical literature on the impacts of 
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* The paper benefited from comments from seminar participants at Stirling, Bergen, Linz and St 
Andrews. The views and opinions offered in this article do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System as a whole. 1. Introduction
When it comes to improving the economic circumstances of low income parents, policy makers
increasingly turn to the tax and beneﬁt system for serendipitous solutions. For example, one
of the key objectives of the “making work pay” agenda in the United States, Canada, and
Britain has been to boost in-work beneﬁts oﬀered to low-income parents (especially single
mothers) through more generous amounts of tax credits, lower withdrawal (phase-out) rates,
and substantial childcare subsidies. Examples include the policies implemented through the
American Earned Income Tax Credit, the Canadian Self-Suﬃciency Program, and the British
Working Families’ Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit (Michalopoulos et al. 2002; Eissa and
Hoynes 2004; Morris et al. 2005; Grogger and Karoly 2005; Gennetian et al. 2005; Meyer 2007;
Brewer 2008; Gregg 2008; Brewer et al. 2009).
Despite the popularity of these reforms among policy makers, however, the ways in which
they may aﬀect the overall welfare of low-income families is often not fully understood. In
particular, little is known about the potential of tax-beneﬁt-program induced behavioral re-
sponses to have an adverse impact on child well-being in lone parent families. A growing body
of empirical research documents that changes in tax and beneﬁt policies can have or have had
unfavorable eﬀects on single mothers’ health and well-being (e.g., Bitler et al. 2002 and 2005;
Francesconi and van der Klaauw 2007; Baker et al. 2008; Grogger and Karoly 2009; Brewer et
al. 2009) as well as on a wide array of their children’s outcomes (e.g., Clark-Kauﬀman et al.
2003; Gennetian et al. 2002 and 2005; Baker et al. 2008; Herbst and Tekin 2008; Grogger and
Karoly 2009; Gregg et al. 2009). There is still insuﬃcient appreciation for the ramiﬁcations
of such unintended or unanticipated consequences of welfare reform. The contribution of this
paper, therefore, is to provide a new theoretical setup that can coherently explain these unde-
sirable eﬀects and can also deliver testable implications on the strategic interactions between
divorced parents and on child welfare.
Our study is based on the seminal contributions by Weiss and Willis (1985, 1993) and Del
Boca and Flinn (1995). These studies, which treat labor supply decisions and post-divorce in-
comes of former spouses as exogenous, provide a formal analysis of the noncooperative behavior
of divorced parents in terms of child support transfers and expenditures on children.1 We build
on these earlier studies by (i) modeling the labor supply decision of the custodial parent and
(ii) explicitly incorporating the tax-beneﬁt program.
1Flinn (2000) allows the type of interaction between former partners, whether it is noncooperative or coop-
erative, to be determined endogenously. We shall return to this idea in Section 2 and in one of our extensions
in Section 5.
2We then focus on the eﬀects of tax-beneﬁt policy changes on divorced parents’ labor supply,
consumption and child support transfer decisions and on child well-being in single parent house-
holds. We posit that child well-being is determined by the combination of purchased goods and
parental time, which in the case of single parent households reduces to the time allocated by the
custodial (lone) parent only. For simplicity, the time devoted to the child by the noncustodial
parent is assumed to have no eﬀect on child well-being. In this environment, then, divorced
parents make three decisions noncooperatively. The noncustodial parent chooses the amount of
child support payment to transfer to the custodial parent, and the custodial parent decides over
both child good expenditures and the allocation of time between market work and childcare.
Each parent has preferences deﬁned over own consumption and child welfare. Child welfare
depends positively on expenditures and the amount of time the child spends with the custodial
parent. One hour spent away from the custodial parent (for instance, in formal daycare, while
the mother works) is assumed to contribute less (is less productive) to child welfare than one
hour spent with the mother. Child welfare therefore is a local public good from the point of
view of both parents, although only the custodial parent gets to decide how much to spend on
child goods and how to allocate time between paid work and parenting.
With this setup, we ﬁrst characterize the noncooperative behavior of divorced parents in
terms of child support payments, time allocated to parenting, and child good expenditures.
Because the noncustodial parent does not have control over the expenditure and time allocation
decisions of the custodial parent, it is not feasible for the ex-spouses to reach a Pareto eﬃcient
allocation of their resources. As a consequence, the noncustodian provides less than optimal
child support transfers. The custodian, instead, not only spends too little on child goods, but
also devotes too much time to market work and too little to childcare. Thus, the ineﬃciencies
that arise in our framework are threefold and correspond to the three parental decisions under
analysis: on the custodial side, child quality suﬀers because of ineﬃciently high levels of labor
supply and ineﬃciently low expenditures on child goods, and on the noncustodial side child
support payments are suboptimally low.
Using this framework, we then investigate the impact of policy reforms that are meant
to improve lone parents’ well-being. We document that more generous government transfers
provided to custodial parents (in the form of, say, income support or child tax credits) increase
well-being of both custodial and noncustodial parents as well as that of their children. This
is a straightforward result. A new result, instead, emerges when we look at the eﬀect of
increasing the custodian’s eﬀective wage, through either greater childcare subsidies or lower
withdrawal (phase-out) rates or both. While standard theory suggests that an exogenous
3increase in the eﬀective wage rate should raise lone mothers’ well-being (although not necessarily
that of their children), in our model it can reduce the utility of divorced custodial parents and
depress the welfare of their children. This is because an increase in the mother’s eﬀective
wage reinforces the ineﬃciencies induced by noncooperation. That is, such an increase further
depresses child support transfers from noncustodial fathers and accentuates over-work among
custodial mothers. This greater labor supply is the net eﬀect of a direct substitution eﬀect
(i.e., the opportunity cost of not engaging in paid work goes up) and a strategic multiplier
eﬀect (i.e., a response to the reduced child support transfer from the noncustodian). There are
circumstances (that we shall characterize later) in which these eﬀects interact so as to oﬀset
the positive income eﬀect to depress divorced parents’ utility and child welfare.
This ﬁnding provides an important insight that has been overlooked so far: welfare policies
that subsidize childcare expenditures or reduce withdrawal rates, which are most certainly
intended to improve the conditions of working single parents and their children, could actually
have the reverse eﬀect. This implication is robust to the inclusion of issues of compliance
with child support awards imposed by external institutional agents (e.g., courts or judges),
and it is also robust to the alternative assumption that divorced parents can choose to behave
cooperatively instead of noncooperatively in the case of low-income households.2
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the links of our con-
tribution to the relevant literature. Section 3 sets up the basic model, while Section 4 provides
the main equilibrium analysis and illustrates the eﬀects of tax-beneﬁt changes on divorced par-
ents’ and children’s well-being. Section 5 explores two extensions of the basic model in detail,
i.e., compliance with child support orders by the noncustodial parent and cooperation among
divorced parents. Section 6 relates our theoretical results to some of the existing empirical
evidence and discusses some ideas for future research. For ease of exposition all proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2. Related Literature
Our work is closely related to a number of other previous studies on the behavior of divorced
parents. Weiss and Willis (1985) address the question of why many divorced fathers allow their
children’s welfare to suﬀer as a consequence of divorce. Children are treated as collective con-
sumption goods from the point of view of both parents. Within marriage parents’ cooperative
behavior allows them to overcome the ineﬃciencies typically associated with public goods provi-
2In an environment in which the mode of interaction between divorced parents is determined endogenously
(as in Flinn [2000]), we show in Section 5 that a tax-beneﬁt reform that increases the eﬀective wage of custodial
parents may induce low-income divorced parents to behave noncooperatively instead of cooperatively.
4sion.3 Upon divorce, however, the noncustodial parent cannot control the expenditure decisions
of the custodial parent. This, in turn, prevents the ex-spouses from reaching an eﬃcient alloca-
tion of their resources, with the noncustodial parent making inadequate child support payments
and the custodial parent devoting too few material resources to child goods.4 Our addition to
this line of thinking is that ineﬃcient allocations may not only involve child good expenditures
but also parental time devoted to childcare (as opposed to paid work). This additional dimen-
sion is very important in the context of in-work beneﬁt reforms, because ineﬃciencies related
to time allocation decisions might be exacerbated by such reforms.
Del Boca and Flinn (1995) develop a noncooperative framework in which both child support
compliance decisions of noncustodial fathers and court-mandated child support awards can be
rationalized. Structural estimates of their model, which qualitatively replicate the observed
distribution of child support payments, can be used to infer the implicit weights assigned by
courts to the post-divorce welfare of both parents and children. The results indicate that the
weight attached to the combined welfare of custodial mothers and their children is smaller than
the weight attached to the welfare of noncustodial fathers. Courts may therefore set relatively
low child support orders not only because they are concerned with fathers’ noncompliance but
also because they assign a large weight on fathers’ welfare. As illustrated in Section 5, extending
our basic framework to a model that incorporates child support orders does not alter our main
results.
Our results partially continue to hold when we extend our model and allow for cooperation
among divorced parents to arise endogenously. In particular, a tax-beneﬁt change that increases
the eﬀective wage of the custodial parent may induce low-income divorced parents, who would
have otherwise chosen to behave cooperatively, to switch their mode of behavior and implement
a noncooperative equilibrium. Conversely, high-income divorced parents may respond to such
a tax-beneﬁt change by behaving cooperatively instead of noncooperatively. This extension
follows the approach proposed by Flinn (2000), in which compliance with child support orders
is equivalent to parental cooperation (and eﬃcient levels of child good expenditures can then be
achieved), while noncompliance is equivalent to noncooperative behavior (and only suboptimal
3A recent strand of analysis argues that ineﬃcient intrahousehold allocations are plausible even in marriage
as long as current decisions aﬀect future bargaining power and spouses cannot make binding commitments over
allocations within marriage. See, among others, Lundberg and Pollak (2003) and our brief discussion below.
4Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School of 1972, Weiss and Willis (1993)
analyze the eﬀects of spouses’ incomes on transfers among divorced couples. They ﬁnd that divorce transfers
tend to increase with the noncustodial parent’s income and to decline with the custodial parent’s income, while
child expenditures in the divorce state are estimated to be half of those that would occur during marriage. This
last ﬁnding is consistent with the estimates reported in Jarvis and Jenkins (1999) for Britain and Page and
Stevens (2004) for the United States.
5allocations can be attained). The type of parental interaction in the divorce state, whether co-
operative or noncooperative, is determined endogenously, with compliance being observed when
the gains from cooperation exceed the value of noncooperation for both parents. Structural es-
timates of Flinn’s model indicate that an increase in child support enforcement activities (by
courts or other institutional agents) have only modest positive eﬀects on the welfare of children
of divorced parents.5
Although our paper focuses on the interactions between divorced parents, the approach of
the paper also has much in common with bargaining models of household decisions among mar-
ried couples used in recent contributions, such as Grogger and Karoly (2009) and Francesconi
et al. (2009). Both these studies point out that work-conditioned transfer programs can cause
the likelihood of divorce either to rise or to fall. This is because such programs may alter
the non-marital options faced by single mothers and, at the same time, they may also aﬀect
the marital utility-possibility frontier. Likewise, changes in one spouse’s nonmarital alterna-
tives induced by in-work beneﬁt reform could aﬀect child well-being through their inﬂuence
on intrahousehold resource allocations, and this relationship again is likely to be ambiguous.
Our results also have implications for the collective approach to household behavior developed
by Chiappori (1992), Browning and Chiappori (1998), and Blundell et al. (2005, 2007). If a
tax-beneﬁt policy reform aﬀects the feasible utilities of divorced mothers, and if the outside
option to marriage is divorce, then it might also aﬀect married couples indirectly by changing
intra-household sharing rules so as to reﬂect the preferences of married mothers either more
or less strongly. Finally, ambiguous eﬀects of family policies have also been identiﬁed by non-
cooperative models of household decision-making (e.g., Konrad and Lommerud 1995; Chen and
Wooley 2001). Our work, therefore, will extend such strands of research to divorced parents
and their children.
Concerns about the well-being of children of divorced parents have also been raised by
several recent theoretical (e.g., Chiappori and Weiss, 2006 and 2007; Chiappori et al., 2007)
and empirical (e.g., Gruber 2004; Wolfers 2006; Stevenson and Wolfers 2006; Stevenson 2007)
studies, which examine the role played by the legal environment surrounding the family in
general and by divorce law in particular. Our work shares these concerns, although we focus on
the changes in parental behavior that might be induced by reforms of the tax-beneﬁt system
rather than by other legal changes. This focus allows us to address (and possibly understand)
5A similar conclusion is reached in Roﬀ (2008), which uses a noncooperative framework to analyze the child
support and welfare participation decisions of never-married parents on welfare. Single mothers choose whether
to exit welfare, report paternity and obtain a child support order. If child support orders are awarded, fathers
choose whether to comply with them or not. Structural estimates show that high child support awards can lead
to a reduction in child support payments from noncustodial fathers to custodial mothers.
6some of the unexpected or counterintuitive eﬀects of welfare reform that have been documented,
among others, by Harknett and Gennetian (2003), Clark-Kauﬀman et al. (2003), Bitler et al.
(2005, 2006), Morris et al. (2007), Baker et al. (2008), Herbst and Tekin (2008), and Gregg
et al. (2009). We shall link our main results, which are outlined in the next three sections, to
such empirical ﬁndings in Section 6.
3. The Basic Framework
The goal of our analysis is to understand how changes in the tax-beneﬁt system, and espe-
cially in in-work beneﬁts (such as EITC and WFTC), aﬀect the behavior of divorced parents.
Consider a non-intact family that is comprised of a child, a custodial mother m, and a non-
resident/noncustodial father f. Each parent i (i = f,m) has preferences deﬁned over private
consumption, xi, and child welfare, C. Child welfare depends on both childcare quality, q, and
child good expenditures, k, and is produced according to
C = F(k,q) = k
aq
b (1)
where the parameters a and b are such that 0 < a < 1, 0 < b < 1 and a+b < 1 which implies that
the function F is strictly increasing in each of its arguments and is strictly concave. Parental








where γf and γm, which represent the preference weights on own consumption for the father
and the mother respectively, are assumed to be contained in the open unit interval. It is useful
to deﬁne
αi = a(1 − γi) and βi = b(1 − γi) (3)
as parent i’s (i = f,m) productivity-weighted preferences over k and q, respectively. Substi-










For simplicity (but also reﬂecting the prevailing norm in living arrangements among divorced
parents), we assume that the mother has legal and physical custody of the child. Under this sole
custody assumption, the mother controls both childcare quality (q) and child good expenditures
(k), while the father cannot monitor his ex-spouse’s resource allocation directly. The only way
in which the father can aﬀect q and k is through child support payments, s, which are transferred
7to the mother. The interactions we are interested in are those between the mother and the
father. In the background, besides the child, there is however another inactive player, namely a
welfarist government that may choose some key institutional variables, such as in-work beneﬁt
levels and childcare subsidies to daycare costs.
We envisage a two-stage game between m and f, which unfolds as follows. In stage 1, the
father chooses the monetary level of child support, s, to transfer to the mother. Assuming that
the father’s labor supply is ﬁxed and that he has income y > 0, s lies in [0,y]. In stage 2, s is
received (and observed) by the mother. The mother, who has a unit of active time endowment,
spends the fraction l ∈ [0,1) of time working in the labor market and the remaining fraction
h = 1−l in childcare activities. Having chosen l, the mother then decides on how to divide her
after-tax income between private consumption, xm, and child good expenditures, k.6
To keep our analysis simple, leisure decisions are not modeled. Thus, h can be viewed
as maternal time input used to produce childcare quality q. Speciﬁcally, we assume that q
is produced according to a technology that is linear in both the fraction of time the custodial
mother spends with the child (1−l) and the fraction of time the child is looked after by someone
else while the mother works (l). There is therefore an implicit equivalence between maternal
hours of work and paid childcare,7 and these two inputs are assumed to be imperfect substitutes.
Setting the marginal productivity (or quality) of maternal time to 1 and the quality of formal
childcare to ψ, childcare quality q is produced according to
q = (1 − l) + ψl = 1 − δl, (5)
where δ = 1 − ψ > 0 is a parameter that captures the diﬀerence between maternal childcare
quality and the quality of childcare purchased in the market. In assuming δ > 0 we explicitly
posit that, while purchased childcare services may contribute to child welfare, they are of inferior
quality in comparison to maternal childcare.8
Since a working single mother must rely on childcare and if this must be paid for,9 she
faces an eﬀective wage which falls short of her after-tax wage by the hourly price of childcare.
6Del Boca and Flinn (1995) and Flinn (2000) also consider an environment in which decision making proceeds
sequentially. This assumption simpliﬁes our analysis. Notice, however, that all our main insights would also
hold in the corresponding simultaneous-move game.
7This equivalence is imposed to ease the exposition of some results, without aﬀecting our main insights.
Indeed, all results are robust to using a linear relationship between hours of paid work and childcare, as
supported by the empirical evidence presented in Duncan et al. (1995).
8Empirical research on the eﬀect of nonmaternal care on child developmental and behavioral outcomes tends
to document a strong negative relationship (e.g., Belsky 2001, NICHD-ECCRN 2003, Baker et al. 2008, and
references therein). Negative formal childcare eﬀects also emerge in the case of later child outcomes (e.g., Bernal
and Keane 2008; Liu et al. 2008).
9Indeed, some in-work beneﬁts — such as WFTC in the UK — entail additional tax credits when mothers
use paid childcare services (e.g., those oﬀered by registered daycare centers and childminders). Not allowing
8Formally, if we denote by w > 0 the mother’s hourly wage rate and by p > 0 the hourly price
of formal childcare, the mother’s eﬀective wage rate is
w = w(1 − τ) − p, (6)
where τ is the marginal rate of income tax. The government might raise the mother’s eﬀective
wage w by reducing the marginal rate of income tax (lower τ) or by providing more generous
childcare subsidies (lower p). The after-tax income of the mother is then
wl + B + s, (7)
where B ≥ 0 denotes government transfers (e.g., income support, child beneﬁt, and child tax
credit) and s is the child support payment from the noncustodial father. Throughout our
analysis, we will maintain the following simplifying restriction on the model parameters:
Assumption 1
0 <
(αm + γm)w − βmδB
wδ(αm + βm + γm)
< 1.
This places a lower bound (w) and an upper bound (w) on the value of the mother’s eﬀective
wage rate, w.10 As will become apparent later, the upper bound ensures that the mother’s
labor supply is less than 1, i.e., it rules out solutions in which the mother spends her entire
time endowment working in the labor market. The lower bound guarantees that, in the absence
of a positive child support payment from the noncustodial father, the mother would always ﬁnd
it optimal to participate in the labor market by choosing labor supply greater than 0. The
latter assumption not only enables us to simplify the analysis but is also justiﬁed by the goal
of this work, which is focused on providing useful insights into the eﬀects of tax-beneﬁt policy
changes on divorced parents’ labor supply and child support decisions.11
4. The Eﬀect of Tax-Beneﬁt Policy Reform on Divorced Parents’ Behavior
Having described the framework in which the two-stage game between f and m takes place,
we now characterize its subgame-perfect equilibrium using standard backwards induction ar-
guments. We then consider how changing the institutional parameters (B and w) aﬀects the
equilibrium choices and describe the underlying welfare eﬀects.
women to use on unpaid/informal childcare services (e.g., those oﬀered by relatives and friends) may be slightly
unrealistic, but allows our model to capture some salient aspects of recent tax-beneﬁt policy reforms. Extending
this framework to account for both types of childcare is an interesting exercise which is left for future research.
10These are w = δβmB/(αm + γm) and w = δβmB/[(1 − δ)(αm + γm) − δβm], respectively.
11For women with wage rates below w, we are back to a setting similar to that in Weiss and Willis (1985)
and Del Boca and Flinn (1995) which treats the custodian’s labor supply decision and income as exogenous.
In such an environment, the allocation of resources within non-intact families would be independent of policies
aimed at increasing the (non-working) custodian’s eﬀective wage.
9A. Mother’s Decisions
Fix an arbitrary child support payment s ∈ [0,y] made by the father in stage 1. In stage
2, the custodial mother decides how to allocate her time between market work and childcare
activities by choosing l, and then chooses how to allocate her after-tax income between private
consumption, xm, and expenditures on the child, k. It is useful to decompose the second stage
into a step where the mother ﬁrst makes her time allocation decision and then decides over her
income allocation.
Consider ﬁrst the budget allocation decision. The mother’s after-tax income is B +wl + s.
Let πx denote her income share in private consumption xm, and πk her income share in child
goods k. Then, the mother’s income allocation problem is
max
πx,πk
[πx(B + wl + s)]
γm[πk(B + wl + s)]
αmq
βm (8)
subject to πx + πk = 1.12 Cobb-Douglas preferences imply constant expenditure shares,
















Consider now the time allocation decision. Under (5), the mother’s second stage time





x(B + wl + s)]
γm[π
e
k(B + wl + s)]
αm(1 − δl)
βm. (10)
Since there may be a corner solution in which the mother decides not to participate in the labor
market, deﬁne ˜ s to be the child support payment that implicitly solves the mother’s ﬁrst-order
condition when l = 0. This is given by
˜ s =
(αm + γm)w − βmδB
βmδ
(11)
Note that under Assumption 1, ˜ s > 0. The mother’s time allocation decision in stage 2 is then
described by the following:
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Given any arbitrary child support payment s ∈
[0,y] from the father, the mother’s optimal choice of l is:
(i) le = 0, if s > ˜ s; or
12With Cobb-Douglas preferences, this problem is equivalent to choosing (xm,k) to maximize
Um[xm,F(k,q)] = xγm




(αm + γm)w − βmδ(B + s)
wδ(αm + βm + γm)
≡ l
∗(s), if s < ˜ s. (12)
Therefore, mothers who receive a transfer above the threshold ˜ s choose to be out of the labor
market, while those who receive a transfer below ˜ s choose to be in paid employment. Expres-
sion (12) reﬂects the trade-oﬀ between home-produced childcare quality and employment as
a function of the father’s support payment s and the institutional parameters B and w. It
can be easily veriﬁed that an increase in s reduces the mother’s labor supply. Intuitively, if
the mother receives a relatively high child support transfer, she is willing to substitute work
time in the market for childcare time at home, and this has a beneﬁcial impact on childcare
quality. An increase in w, instead, raises labor supply. The mother’s demand functions for
private consumption and child good expenditures satisfy standard properties: that is, they
are increasing in s, B, and w. Finally, child welfare—which positively depends on child good
expenditures and maternal time—is strictly increasing in s and B. An increase in w, however,
has an ambiguous eﬀect on child welfare: while it increases child good expenditures, it also
reduces the amount of time the child receives direct interaction with the mother.
B. Father’s Decision
The father’s budget constraint is xf = y − s. He is assumed to care not only about his own
consumption but also about the welfare of his child.13 Child welfare, in turn, depends on child
good expenditures, ke = πe
k(B+wle+s), and childcare quality, qe = 1−δle, which are controlled











His decision is driven by the way in which child good expenditures and childcare quality vary
with child support transfers. The following result, which is illustrated in Figure 1, characterizes
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of our model.






δ(αf + βf)y − γf(w + δB)
δ(αf + βf + γf)
. (14)
Let y(w) solve s∗ = ˜ s; and let y(w) solve s∗ = 0. Then, y(w) > y(w) for all w ∈ (w,w), and:































Figure 1: Equilibrium child support payment (father) and time allocation (mother) decisions
(i) if y ∈ (y(w),y(w)), the father’s optimal support payment is se = s∗, and the mother’s
optimal labor supply is le = l∗(s∗) (“interior equilibrium”).
(ii) if y > y(w), the father’s support payment is se = max{s,˜ s}, and the mother’s labor
supply is le = 0 (“no-employment equilibrium”).
(iii) if y 6 y(w), the father’s support payment is se = 0, and the mother’s labor supply is
le = l∗(0) (“no-support equilibrium”).




k of her equilibrium
after-tax income on private consumption and child goods, respectively.
There are, therefore, three types of equilibria. Consider an arbitrary value of w in the open
interval (w,w). If the father’s income is suﬃciently high, y > y(w), we have a no-employment
equilibrium: here, the child support payment made by the father, se = max{s, ˜ s}, is high
enough to allow the mother to choose full-time parenting, so that le = 0 (case (ii)). If the
father’s income instead is at an intermediate level, y ∈ (y(w),y(w)), then we are at an interior
equilibrium (case (i)): the child support payment made by the father, se = s∗, is positive but
not large enough to enable the mother to spend all of her time looking after the child, and so
she decides to supply a positive amount of labor to the market, namely le = l∗(s∗). Finally, if
the father’s income is low, y 6 y(w), we have a no-support equilibrium (case (iii)): here, the
12father does not volunteer any child support payments, i.e., se = 0, while the mother devotes a
relatively large proportion of her time to market work, le = l∗(0).14
The main aim of this study is to develop an understanding of the interplay between tax-
beneﬁt policy reform and the behavior of divorced parents in terms of child support payments,
time allocated to work and parenting, and child good expenditures. Marginal changes in tax-
beneﬁt policies have no direct eﬀect on mothers’ labor supply decisions in the no-employment
equilibrium, and so we will not focus on it. In addition, since marginal policy changes have no
impact on the behavior of divorced fathers in the no-support equilibrium, we will not focus on it
either.15 Therefore, we focus mainly on the interior equilibrium in which neither parent is bound
by non-negativity constraints. The two most interesting features of this interior equilibrium are
its eﬃciency properties and the comparative statics with respect to the tax-beneﬁt parameters
(B and w), to which we now turn.
C. Eﬃciency Properties of the Equilibrium
A key aspect of our model is that child well-being is a public good from the point of view of
both parents, although only the custodial parent decides on childcare quality and child good
expenditures. In our setting, there is no self-enforcing mechanism that induces the custodian
to internalize the impact of her choices on the noncustodian. In particular, noncooperative
behavior implies that the ex-spouses cannot negotiate and then commit to binding and costlessly
enforceable agreements. As a consequence, they fail to achieve a socially-eﬃcient allocation of
their resources. The following proposition describes the distortions that arise in this framework.
Proposition 3 In an interior equilibrium, where se = s∗, le = l∗(s∗) and πe
k = π∗
k, each of
(i) a marginal increase in πk, (ii) a marginal reduction in l, and (iii) a marginal increase in s
would lead to a Pareto improvement.
The interior equilibrium suﬀers from three ineﬃciencies. On the custodial side, the amount
spent on child goods is not eﬃcient, since the mother does not internalize the eﬀect of her
income allocation on the father. This is a standard problem which has been discussed before
(Weiss and Willis 1985; Flinn 2000). However, in addition to spending an ineﬃciently low
amount on child goods, the mother also supplies an ineﬃciently high amount of labor time to
the market, that is, she spends too much time at work and too little on childcare activities.
On the noncustodial side, anticipating that the mother will spend too little on child goods
14From (12), it is easy to check that, in the no-support equilibrium, the mother works more than in the
interior equilibrium, i.e., l∗(0) ≥ l∗(s∗).
15We will, however, in the next section brieﬂy comment on some comparative static results that would be
obtained in the no-support equilibrium.
13and work too much in the labor market, the father oﬀers inadequate child support payments.
Essentially, the father cannot monitor time and income allocations of his former spouse; thus,
through his child support transfer, he tries to inﬂuence the mother to spend more money on
child goods and substitute hours of parenting for hours of paid work. But because the mother
only spends a fraction of the transfer received from the father on child goods, and because she
supplies more than the socially optimal amount of labor, the father does not fully capture the
social marginal return from his child support payment. Therefore, his transfer is less than the
social optimum.
D. Equilibrium Comparative Statics
So far we have characterized parents’ decisions given the tax policy parameters, B and w.
We now consider how changes in such parameters aﬀect those choices and illustrate the cor-
responding welfare eﬀects. As the choices in the interior equilibrium depend on B and w
(see expressions (12) and (14)), our notation will have to acknowledge this explicitly. The fa-
ther’s optimal transfer then is denoted se = s∗(B,w), and the mother’s optimal labor supply
is le = l∗(B,w,s∗(B,w)). We examine the eﬀects of a policy reform that operates through
two distinct channels. The ﬁrst involves a more generous government transfer to the custodial
parent (higher B); the second implies an increase in the custodian’s eﬀective wage w, which
can be achieved either through greater childcare subsidies (lower p) or through a reduction in
the marginal rate of income tax (lower τ).
We begin with the eﬀects on the father’s child support decision with the following:
Proposition 4 In the interior equilibrium, where le = l∗(B,w,s∗(B,w)) and se = s∗(B,w),
the noncustodian’s child support payment is (i) strictly decreasing in B, and (ii) strictly de-
creasing in w.
This result suggests that greater B and w optimally induce the father to reduce his child
support payment s∗(B,w). Thus, policies that increase government transfers and/or the ef-
fective wage received by the custodial parent will crowd out child support transfers from the
noncustodian. Greater government transfers paid to the mother (part (i) of Proposition 4) have
the same positive eﬀect on her decision environment as an increase in the support payment by
the noncustodial father: that is, it induces the mother to spend more ﬁnancial resources on
child goods, and to substitute hours of childcare at home for hours of work in the market. But
this, in turn, implies that the father can respond to the original increase in welfare payments
by reducing his child support transfer without compromising child welfare.
Slightly more subtle are the issues related to the impact of an increase in the mother’s
14eﬀective wage (part (ii) of Proposition 4). It is useful to separate this into two distinct eﬀects.
First, holding the mother’s labor supply constant, an increase in w raises her after-tax income,
which translates into an increase in child good expenditures. Again, this in turn allows the
father to reduce his transfers without jeopardizing child welfare. In fact, it is as if father’s
income increased, allowing him to expand his private consumption at the expense of child
support payment. Second, an increase in w leads the mother to increase her labor supply.
This will have two opposite eﬀects. On the one hand, it induces the father to increase his
child support payment in an attempt to oﬀset the increase in mother’s labor supply. On the
other hand, it permits the father to reduce his child support transfers because the increase
in mother’s labor supply is accompanied by an increase in her income and thus in child good
expenditures allowing the father to substitute his private consumption for child support. In our
framework, the latter eﬀect strictly dominates the former. Therefore, the net total eﬀect of an
increase in mother’s eﬀective wage is to induce the father to increase his private consumption
and, accordingly, reduce his child support payment.
This substitution from child support to private consumption on the noncustodial side can
have repercussions on both child welfare and parents’ well-being. Before looking at this issue,
we ﬁrst ascertain the eﬀects of the tax-beneﬁt reform on the mother’s labor supply decision.
For this, we have:
Proposition 5 In the interior equilibrium, where le = l∗(B,w,s∗(B,w)) and se = s∗(B,w),
the custodian’s labor supply is (i) strictly decreasing in B, and (ii) strictly increasing in w.
In our model, the interior equilibrium is characterized by the mother choosing ineﬃciently
high levels of labor supply. Proposition 5 indicates that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the
level of government transfers received by the mother will reduce her labor supply, mitigating
the ineﬃciency of over-employment (part (i)). There are two opposite eﬀects at work here. On
the one hand, we have a standard income eﬀect of transfer receipt: an increase in B makes the
mother richer, and this allows her to reduce her labor supply and spend more time at home with
the child. On the other hand, we have an indirect, or strategic, eﬀect: an increase in government
transfers paid to the mother leads the father to reduce his child support payments, and this in
turn increases the mother’s labor supply. The income eﬀect is larger than the strategic eﬀect
in absolute value, and thus the mother’s labor supply is decreasing in B. An increase in the
mother’s eﬀective wage, in contrast, increases her labor supply, reinforcing the ineﬃciency due
to over-employment (part (ii) of Proposition 5). This relationship, again, is driven by two
eﬀects which, in this case, work in the same direction. There is a direct substitution eﬀect: an
increase in the eﬀective wage rate increases the mother’s labor supply since it pushes up the
15opportunity cost of staying at home and looking after the child.16 Besides this direct eﬀect,
there is also a strategic “multiplier” eﬀect. This arises because an increase in the mother’s
eﬀective wage induces the father to reduce child support payments, and this reduction further
magniﬁes the proportion of time the mother chooses to spend in the labor market.
E. Welfare Eﬀects
We now consider the welfare eﬀects generated by the type of policy reform analyzed above. We
are interested not only in how the reform aﬀects the equilibrium utility of mother and father,
but also in its impact on equilibrium child welfare. The questions we address are: What welfare
eﬀects would arise from increasing the government transfers paid to the mother? And what are
the welfare eﬀects of an increase in the mother’s eﬀective wage rate? The answer to the ﬁrst
question is encapsulated in
Proposition 6 In the interior equilibrium, an increase in B would (i) raise the utilities of
custodial and noncustodial parents and (ii) increase child welfare.
This result is perhaps unsurprising. While an increase in government transfers paid to the
mother reduces the child support payment from the father, it nevertheless allows the mother to
reduce her labor supply and spend more ﬁnancial resources on child goods, which unambiguously
raises child welfare and increases both parents’ utilities.
The answer to the second question is more surprising. Letting δ(a+b)/[(1−δ)+δ(a+b)] ≡ γ,
this is given in
Proposition 7 In the interior equilibrium, if the parents’ preference parameters are such that
γf > γ and γm > γ, then an increase in w would (i) lower the utilities of custodial and
noncustodial parents and (ii) reduce child welfare.
We ought to point out that the premises of this proposition (i.e., the assumption on the
preference parameters γf and γm) impose suﬃcient conditions. In fact, there are weaker suﬃ-
cient conditions — which allow for γf < γ and/or γm < γ — under which this ﬁnding holds
too (see Proposition 8 below). The result here implies that, if private consumption has a suf-
ﬁciently large weight in parents’ utilities, then an increase in the eﬀective wage of the mother
(through either a greater childcare subsidy or a lower income tax rate) would unambiguously
reduce child welfare and lower the utility of both parents. This oﬀers us an insight which so
16An increase in the eﬀective wage also makes the mother richer, and this reduces her labor supply. In our
setting, however, this income eﬀect is strictly dominated by the substitution eﬀect described in the text. This is
simply the result of our choice of the Cobb Douglas functional form for parental preferences. However, that the
substitution eﬀects dominate labor supply decisions holds more generally for any forward-sloping labor supply
function.
16far has been overlooked in the literature: a tax-beneﬁt policy that also subsidizes households’
childcare expenditures or lowers marginal income tax rates faced by low-income working single
parents and their children could worsen their well-being.
To see this, notice that we can reformulate the father’s problem of Section 4.B as a choice
between private consumption and child welfare. As long as the mother supplies a positive
fraction of her time in paid work, the father’s problem can be rewritten as:
max
C>C
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Thus, the father’s decision boils down to choosing between child welfare and private consump-
tion as if he had eﬀective money income y + w/δ + B and faced a non-linear price schedule
for child welfare, ρ(w) (C), which depends on the mother’s eﬀective wage and the preference
parameters of her utility function.17 In his decision, the father takes into account the fact that
his former spouse, without having to rely on his transfer, would guarantee a minimum level of
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.
In this context, an increase in the mother’s eﬀective wage rate entails three changes that are
relevant to the father’s decision problem. First, it raises his money income y+w/δ+B; second,
it raises the implicit price for child welfare ρ(w); third, it lowers the minimum amount of child
welfare C(w) the father can obtain when he does not make any child support payment. As
illustrated in Figure 2, at an interior equilibrium these changes produce three eﬀects on the
father’s decision environment:
(a) a money income eﬀect (MIE): holding ρ(w) constant, an increase in w raises the father’s
money income, giving him an incentive to increase his private consumption at the expense
of child support transfers. Intuitively, if we hold the mother’s labor supply constant, an
17If child welfare is evaluated at πe
k = π∗
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.
By inverting the above expression we obtain s = ρ(w) (C) − w/δ − B. It follows that the father’s private
consumption can be written as xf = y − s = (y + w/δ + B) − ρ(w) (C).
18The requirement C > C is therefore the analogue of the constraint s > 0 in the optimization of Section 4.B






























Figure 2: The eﬀects of an increase in the mother’s eﬀective wage from w to w′
increase in w raises her after-tax income, and this increases child good expenditures and
child welfare; this then yields an increase in the father’s eﬀective money income, inducing
the father to increase his private consumption and cut child support.
(b) a real income eﬀect (RIE): allowing now ρ(w) to adjust, an increase in w raises the
implicit price of child welfare as it induces the mother to work more; this in turn reduces
the father’s real income which leads to a reduction in his private consumption and to an
increase in child support payments to the mother in the attempt to mitigate the increase
in her labor supply.
(c) a substitution eﬀect (SE): an increase in w causes the implicit price of child welfare to go
up, thereby increasing the relative attractiveness of private consumption; this induces the
father to substitute private consumption for child welfare (i.e., reduce support payments
to the mother); the utility of the father is unaﬀected but child welfare is reduced.
The ﬁgure also illustrates that the total eﬀect of an increase in w is to increase the father’s
private consumption (with the corresponding reduction in child support payments) and to lower
child welfare. This last reduction is driven by the greater labor supply of the mother, which
18y(w)
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Figure 3: The eﬀects of an increase in w on child and parental welfare
itself is the net result of the direct substitution eﬀect (i.e., the opportunity cost of staying home
goes up) and the strategic multiplier eﬀect (i.e., the response to smaller child support from the
father) described in the previous subsection.
Up until now we have considered the welfare eﬀects of increasing the eﬀective wage earned by
the mother under the assumption that parents’ own-consumption utility weights are suﬃciently
high (γf > γ and γm > γ). These results may continue to hold even when parents’ own-
consumption utility weights are lower (e.g., γf < γ and/or γm < γ). The set of parameter
values in the (y,w)-space for which this occurs is described in the following
Proposition 8 Let
ˆ y(w) =
(αf + γf)w − βfδB
βfδ
and ˜ y(w) =
(αm + γm)w − βmδB
βmδ
. (15)
If the model parameters are such that y > max{ˆ y(w), ˜ y(w)}, then an increase in the eﬀective
wage w would (i) lower the utility of custodial and noncustodial parents and (ii) reduce child
well-being even if γf < γ and/or γm < γ.
Figure 3 illustrates the eﬀects of an increase in w on child and parental welfare in general terms.
Panel (a) plots the father’s income against the mother’s eﬀective wage.19 Panel (b), instead,
plots the own-consumption utility weight of the father against that of the mother. Proposition
7 shows that if parents’ preference parameters are such that γf > γ and γm > γ (region A
19For ease of exposition, the ﬁgure assumes γf = γm. This assumption implies that ˆ y(w) = ˜ y(w). Notice,
however, that ˆ y(w) will be larger (respectively, smaller) than ˜ y(w) if γf > γm (respectively, if γf < γm).
19in panel (b)), then an increase in w would reduce child welfare and lower the utility of both
parents for all (y,w)-combinations that give rise to an interior equilibrium (regions I, II, and III
in panel (a)).20 Proposition 8 establishes that, even if γf < γ and/or γm < γ (regions B to E),
an increase in w would continue to reduce child welfare and lower the utility of both parents as
long as the father’s income and the mother’s wage are such that y > max{ˆ y(w), ˜ y(w)} (region
I in panel (a)). Therefore, even if private consumption carries relatively little weight in parents’
preferences, as long as the income of the noncustodial parent is suﬃciently high, an increase in
the mother’s eﬀective wage will have negative welfare consequences for all parties involved: the
child, the custodial mother, and the noncustodial father.
It is important to underline that an increase in w will not always reduce the welfare of all
parties. Our next step is to discuss conﬁgurations of parameter values for which one of the
parties would be made better oﬀ. If parents’ preference parameters are such that γf > γ and
γm < γ (as in region B), an increase in w would reduce child welfare and lower the mother’s
utility; but the father will experience an increase in utility provided the model parameters
are such that y < ˆ y(w) (as in regions II and III, panel (a)). Thus, if private consumption
carries less weight in the mother’s utility function than in the father’s, and the father’s income
is suﬃciently low, an increase in w would beneﬁt the mother while hurting both the father
and the child. If the preference parameters instead are such that γf < γ and γm > γ (as in
region C), an increase in w would reduce both child well-being and the father’s utility; but
the mother will experience an increase in utility provided that y < ˜ y(w) (regions II and III).
Perhaps surprisingly, there is also a case in which an increase in w lifts the utility levels of both
parents, while reducing child welfare. This occurs if either π(γm)/[1 + π(γm)] < γf < γ and
γm < γ (region D), 21 and y < min{ˆ y(w), ˜ y(w)} (regions II and III, panel (a)); or if γf < γ
and γm < γ (regions D and E) and ˘ y(w) < y < min{ˆ y(w), ˜ y(w)} (region II, panel (a)).
The ﬁnal result of this section completes the picture by describing the set of parameter
values for which all parties involved would beneﬁt from an increase in the eﬀective wage of the
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(1 − δ)[αm + βm + γm]
.
If the model parameters are such that y < ˘ y(w) and γf < π(γm)/[1 + π(γm)], then an increase
in the eﬀective wage w would (i) raise the utility of both custodial and noncustodial parents and
(ii) increase child well-being.
20As shown in Proposition 2 values outside of these regions do not correspond to an interior equilibrium.
21The function π(γm) is explicitly deﬁned in Proposition 9.
20Two conditions must be satisﬁed if an increase in w is to have a positive eﬀect on child and
parental well-being. Not only is it necessary that private consumption carries relatively little
weight in both parents’ preferences (region E), but also the noncustodial father must have a
suﬃciently low income (region III). Thus, policies that increase the eﬀective wage of custodians
are predicted to have positive welfare eﬀects only for low-income divorced parents who value
their private consumption relatively little viz-` a-viz child well-being.
In sum, we have presented a comprehensive analysis of the eﬀects of tax-beneﬁt reform on
the welfare of divorced parents and their children. Our results suggest that programs that
increase the eﬀective wage of custodial parents, either through lower marginal income tax rates
or (as generally promoted with in-work beneﬁt programs) through higher childcare subsidies,
may have unexpected, possibly undesirable, welfare eﬀects amongst divorced families. When
parents’ own-consumption utility weights are suﬃciently high, such reforms may yield a decline
in child and parental welfare. This result continues to hold even when private consumption
carries little weight in parental preferences as long as the noncustodian enjoys a relatively high
income. Only when the noncustodial parent has a low income will we see positive welfare eﬀects,
provided that parental preferences for own consumption are suﬃciently weak.
Remark. Our discussion so far has focused on the negative welfare eﬀects generated by policy
reforms in the interior equilibrium of our model. By contrast, in the no-support equilibrium
(see Proposition 2 and Figure 1), such reforms are less likely to yield declines in child and
parental well-being. Intuitively, this is because an increase in the eﬀective wage of custodial
parents would no longer lead to a strategic multiplier eﬀect, i.e., it would no longer induce the
noncustodial parents to further reduce child support payments. As a consequence, the aggra-
vation of the ineﬃciency due to over-employment is less severe in the no-support equilibrium
than in the interior equilibrium. Formally, in the no-support equilibrium an increase in w would
unambiguously raise the utility of the custodial mother. Moreover, if the model parameters
are such that γm < γ (i.e., the mother’s own-consumption utility weight is suﬃciently low) and
w > ˜ w (i.e., the mother’s wage is suﬃciently high),22 then an increase in w would also raise
the utility of the noncustodial father and increase child well-being. Conversely, if γm > γ, or if
γm < γ and w < ˜ w, then an increase in w would lower the utility of the noncustodial father
and reduce child welfare.
22Here, ˜ w = bδB/a. It is readily checked that ˜ w ∈ (w,w) for all γm < γ.
215. Extensions
We now consider some useful extensions of our basic model. After this, we shall use our main
results to interpret a wide range of ﬁndings that have emerged in the empirical literature.
A. Child Support Orders and the Issue of Compliance
In the model of Section 4, the government exogenously sets B and τ and may choose to sub-
sidize the purchase of formal childcare by varying its unit price p. But it does not inﬂuence
child support transfers through, for instance, a system of court-mandated awards. To examine
whether or not our earlier results change in an environment in which divorced parents face child
support orders, we modify the noncustodial father’s preferences in the way proposed by Del





βf − θI[s < s
o],
where so > 0 is a court-mandated child support order and I[·] is an indicator function.23 The
father pays a ﬁxed cost, θ, if he does not fully comply with the court order. But if his child
support payment meets or exceeds the order, then the cost is avoided. Recall that the father’s






max{s, ˜ s} if y > y(w)
s∗ if y ∈ (y(w),y(w))
0 if y 6 y(w),
where (s∗,s,˜ s) and (y(w),y(w)) are deﬁned in (11) and Proposition 2.
Consider the father’s decision of whether or not to comply with the court order as a function
of y and θ, and assume so < ˜ s. This restriction ensures that the child support order — if fully
complied with — is such that it is optimal for the mother to supply a positive fraction of
her time to the labor market. With these ingredients, we can identify ﬁve diﬀerent types of
compliance behavior. Figure 4 describes these cases as a function of y and θ.
In the previous section we have established that when the father’s income y exceeds the
threshold y(w) the father will voluntarily make a positive child support payment to his former
spouse. If, additionally, his voluntary payment s∗ is greater or equal to so, then the court order
does not bind his transfer behavior. This is the case of overcompliance. Let y+(w) be the
23For simplicity, we assume that the court-mandated order so is independent of the father’s income. However,
our analysis would also go through under the alternative assumption that the father has to pay a ﬁxed percentage
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Figure 4: Tax-beneﬁt policy reform and compliance with child support orders (Note: The
arrows show the eﬀect of an increase in w)
value of the father’s income for which the voluntary payment s∗ is exactly equal to the court
order so.24 Clearly, for the father to choose to be overcompliant, his income must be more than
y+(w).
Consider now the case in which the father’s income is less than y+(w) but more than
y(w). In this case, the father will again make a voluntary transfer to the mother, although
s∗ will not be above the court order so. The father then has two options: he can either
choose undercompliance by making his optimal voluntary transfer s∗ and incurring the cost θ;
or choose exact compliance by paying the order so and avoiding the cost θ. Let λ1(θ,w) be
the value of y which equates the utility value of undercompliance to the utility value of exact
compliance.25 It then follows that a noncustodian with income between y(w) and y+(w) will
24Equating s∗ (see equation (14)) to so and solving for y, it follows that
y+(w) =
γf(w + δB) + soδ(αf + βf + γf)
δ(αf + βf)
.
25Formally, λ1(θ,w) implicitly solves
(y − s∗)γf[πe
k(B + wl∗(s∗) + s∗)]αf[1 − δl∗(s∗)]βf − θ = (y − so)γf[πe
k(B + wl∗(so) + so)]αf[1 − δl∗(so)]βf.
23choose undercompliance if y < λ1(θ,w), and exact compliance if y > λ1(θ,w).
Finally, consider the case in which the father, in absence of court orders, would voluntarily
make no child support payment to the mother. This case occurs when the father’s income is
less than y(w). As before, the father faces two options: he can either make no transfer and
bear the cost θ, or choose exact compliance at no cost. If λ2(θ,w) denotes the value of y which
equates the utility value of no child support payment with that of exact compliance,26 then a
father who makes no transfer will have y < λ2(θ,w), while a father with y > λ2(θ,w) will
exactly comply with the court order.
We now use this extended model to examine how in-work beneﬁt reform aﬀects the com-
pliance behavior of noncustodial parents. For the sake of brevity, we focus on the eﬀects of
a singly policy—an increase in the eﬀective wage of the custodial mother. All our results on
compliance behavior, however, also apply to a policy that oﬀers greater government transfers
B to the custodian. Under the assumption that y and θ are independently distributed random
variables, we have the following
Proposition 10 A tax-beneﬁt policy reform that aims at increasing the eﬀective wage of cus-
todial mothers would reduce the set of fathers who choose either to overcomply or to exactly
comply with child support orders. The set of fathers who choose either to undercomply or to
make no child support payment would increase accordingly.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. First, an increase in w reduces the voluntary
child support payment that fathers with y < y(w) would optimally make. This essentially
pushes up the income threshold y+(w) above which fathers choose to overcomply with respect
to court orders. Hence, the incidence of overcompliance will decline. Second, for any given
value of θ, an increase in w reduces the utility value of exact compliance relative to that of
undercompliance. This is because undercompliance allows fathers to reduce their child support
payments optimally in response to an increase in w, while exact compliance does not allow for
such utility-maximizing adjustments. Thus, the income threshold λ1(θ,w) shifts outwards. A
similar argument establishes that an increase in w drives a wedge between the utility value of
no child support payment and that of exact compliance, and so λ2(θ,w) shifts outwards too.
Hence, the incidence of exact compliance will go down.
In general, tax-beneﬁt policies that alter the economic circumstances of divorced parents,
especially those programs that try to raise custodial parents’ eﬀective wages, may crowd out
The left-hand side of this expression is the utility value of undercompliance, while the right-hand side represents
the utility value of exact compliance. Note that l∗(s) and s∗, which are respectively deﬁned in (12) and (14),
are functions of w.
26Clearly, λ2(θ,w) solves the same expression as λ1(θ,w) earlier, but with the voluntary transfer s∗ replaced
by 0.
24the voluntary child support transfers from noncustodial parents, even in presence of court-
mandated child support awards. Adding child support orders to the institutional environment,
therefore, does not qualitatively change our earlier results, implying that the potential for
welfare-conditioned beneﬁt reforms to have unintended (and presumably undesirable) conse-
quences remains.
B. Cooperation among Divorced Parents
Divorced parents could choose to behave cooperatively rather than noncooperatively, as we
have assumed so far. Flinn (2000) examines situations in which cooperative behavior among
divorced parents arises in a model without taxation. In Flinn’s setup, a third party (e.g., the
court or a judge) suggests a “focal equilibrium” through speciﬁc child support orders. Full
compliance with such orders is equivalent to cooperation which, in turn, leads parents to reach
eﬃcient levels of child good expenditures. Here, we extend this setup to investigate the extent
to which tax-beneﬁt changes aﬀect the emergence of cooperation among divorced parents. Our
key question is: How do in-work beneﬁt reforms inﬂuence the likelihood of divorced parents to
comply with the suggestion of a focal arbitrator on child support transfers and implement a
cooperative equilibrium?
For simplicity, we consider the case in which the parents’ preference parameters are identical,
i.e., γm = γf = γ. To derive the cooperative allocation of the parents’ joint resources, suppose
the mother decides not only how much to spend on child goods and how to allocate her time
between childcare and market work, but also how much child support she should receive from
the father, though her choices are constrained by the father receiving a utility level of at least
˜ Uf. Then, the decision problem of the mother can be represented by
max
k,l,s
(wl + B + s − k)
γk
α(1 − δl)
β s.t. (y − s)
γk
α(1 − δl)
β > ˜ Uf, (16)
where α = a(1 − γ) and β = b(1 − γ). The strict concavity of the parental utility functions
implies that the constraint in (16) always binds and that the mother’s utility level is a decreasing
function of the guaranteed utility level of the father. Moreover, under the assumption that
parents have identical preference parameters, the cooperative levels of child goods expenditure
(kc) and time allocated to work (lc) are independent of the child support payment from the
father to the mother,27 and can be stated as follows. Deﬁne π = α/(α + γ) and ℓ(w) =
27Intuitively, if the mother and the father have identical preferences over consumption and child welfare, there
are no conﬂicts as to how much money should be spent on child goods and how much time should be devoted
to parenting.




0 if y > ˆ y(w)




π(y + B) if y > ˆ y(w)
π[wℓ(w) + y + B] if y < ˆ y(w)
(17)
where ˆ y(w) is deﬁned in (15) but with the subscript f suppressed.28 Thus, if the noncustodial
father enjoys a suﬃciently large income (region I in Figure 3), then in a cooperative equilibrium
the mother would choose full-time childcare and no paid work, while in the corresponding non-
cooperative equilibrium she would optimally supply a positive amount of labor to the market.
This is consistent with our earlier observation that the noncooperative equilibrium suﬀers from
ineﬃciently high levels of labor supply.
As in Flinn’s (2000) model, we envisage an institutional agent acting as a focal arbitrator
and proposing a particular child support order so. The parents then work out whether the child
support order is incentive compatible, i.e., they determine whether so guarantees both of them
cooperative utility values that are not exceeded by their respective noncooperative levels. If so
is incentive-compatible, a cooperative equilibrium with lc(w) and kc(w) is implemented. If it
is not, then the noncooperative equilibrium is selected.
The set of child support payments under which both parents have an incentive to implement
a cooperative equilibrium must be identiﬁed. The larger this “cooperation set”, the better the
chances that the child support order proposed by the focal arbitrator is contained in it. We
look at the extremes of this set. The highest child support order compatible with cooperation
occurs at a point in which the father obtains his noncooperative utility level and the mother
receives the entire surplus from cooperation. Formally,
U
∗



















f(w) is the utility level the father would achieve under noncooperation. At the opposite
extreme, the lowest child support order compatible with cooperation should occur at a point
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28Note that under the assumption that the ex-spouses have identical preferences, the two income thresholds
ˆ y(w) and ˜ y(w) are identical.
26where U∗
m(w) is the utility level the mother would achieve under noncooperation. A cooperative
equilibrium will be implemented if the child support order so is contained in the cooperation
set, (s(w),s(w)).
We now examine how this cooperation set varies with changes in work-conditioned beneﬁts.
As before, our focus is on one speciﬁc in-work beneﬁt reform, that is, an increase in the eﬀective
wage of the custodial mother. In relation to the maximum child support order compatible with
a cooperative equilibrium, we establish
Proposition 11 The maximum child support payment that could be observed in cooperative
equilibrium, s(w), is increasing in w as long as y > ˆ y(w). It is decreasing in w whenever
y < ˆ y(w).
This proposition has two implications. First, consider high-income divorced couples with
y > ˆ y(w) (region I in Figure 3). In the noncooperative equilibrium of the model of Section 4,
an increase in the eﬀective wage of the mother generates negative welfare eﬀects for divorced
parents and their children (Proposition 8). Now, however, a reform that increases the eﬀective
wage of the custodian from w to some w′ > w might lead ex-spouses to behave cooperatively.
In particular, when the father’s income is high enough (i.e., y > ˆ y(w)), then s(w′) > s(w) and
divorced parents may end up in a cooperative equilibrium, provided that so ∈ (s(w),s(w′)).
Put this diﬀerently, if so > s(w), the child support order proposed by the focal arbitrator is
too high and cooperation cannot be achieved prior to the reform. But the introduction of the
reform, by deﬁnition, increases the maximum child support compatible with cooperation from
s(w) to s(w′), and this will induce high-income divorced parents to accept the court’s suggestion
and thus play cooperatively. This occurs because high-income fathers would suﬀer utility losses
if they continue to behave noncooperatively after the implementation of the reform.
Second, consider low-income fathers who have an income y < ˆ y(w) as in regions II and III
of Figure 3. In the noncooperative equilibrium of the model of Section 4, an increase in the
eﬀective wage of the mother generates utility gains for divorced parents. Now, instead, a policy
reform that increases the wage of the custodian from w to some w′ > w might induce ex-spouses
who would have chosen to behave cooperatively prior to the reform to switch their mode of
behavior and play noncooperatively. In fact, when y < ˆ y(w), then s(w′) < s(w), and divorced
parents will have an incentive to behave noncooperatively provided that so ∈ (s(w′),s(w)).
For low-income divorced parents, therefore, an eﬀective-wage-increasing policy reform might
reduce the likelihood of accepting the child support order suggested by the court and ending
up in a cooperative equilibrium. This is because low-income divorced fathers would see their
utility levels associated with noncooperation increase after the introduction of the reform.
27Our ﬁnal result completes the picture and looks at the eﬀects of an increase in the eﬀective
wage of the mother on the minimum child support order associated with cooperation. This is
given in
Proposition 12 The minimum child support payment that could be observed in cooperative
equilibrium, s(w), is decreasing in w as long as y > ˆ y(w). It is ambiguously aﬀected by a
change in w whenever y < ˆ y(w).
Imagine an in-work beneﬁt reform that increases the wage of the custodian from w to
w′ > w. If so < s(w), then divorced parents would fail to cooperate prior to the reform because
the child support order suggested by the focal arbitrator is too low to be incentive compatible.
For high-income fathers, the introduction of the reform will unambiguously reduce the minimum
child support payment associated with cooperation, and this might result in parents accepting
the arbitrator’s proposal and switching to a cooperative equilibrium. Whether such a switch
will also be observed among low-income divorced parents is ambiguous.
In sum, when the mode of interaction (cooperative vs noncooperative) between divorced
parents is a matter of choice through compliance with court-mandated child support orders
and selection of eﬃcient levels of child good expenditures, the introduction of in-work beneﬁt
reforms may induce parents to behave either cooperatively or noncooperatively. Divorced cou-
ples with high-income fathers, who under noncooperation would suﬀer from a reform aimed at
increasing the eﬀective wage of custodial mothers, might behave cooperatively in response to
the reform. From a welfare viewpoint, this switch will translate into a welfare improvement for
all parties involved. Conversely, low-income divorced fathers may ﬁnd it optimal to behave non-
cooperatively instead of cooperatively. This will lead to a welfare loss. Allowing for cooperation
among divorced parents, therefore, does not necessarily alter our earlier results of Section 4.
Even when ex-spouses can cooperate, in-work beneﬁt reforms that are meant to improve custo-




Establishing that public policy reforms may have unintended (and, sometimes, undesirable)
consequences on behavior and well-being is not new (Moﬃtt 1992; Blank 2002). Unexpected
29An increase in government transfers B generally produces ambiguous eﬀects on the mode of interaction
between divorced parents. On the one hand, it increases both parents’ utilities from behaving noncooperatively
(see Proposition 6), which reduces the likelihood of cooperation. On the other hand, it increases also the parents’
utilities from cooperation.
28outcomes have been observed not only among individuals and households directly targeted by
welfare programs but also among individuals whose behavior and well-being were not meant to
be aﬀected (Grogger et al. 2002; Bitler et al. 2005; Grogger and Karoly 2005, 2009; Gregg et
al. 2009; Francesconi et al. 2009).
Our results suggest a number of potential undesirable eﬀects that recent in-work beneﬁt
reforms introduced in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries
may have had. If the generosity of such policies increases through an increase in the level of
government transfers received by the custodial parent, then these policies are likely to crowd out
the child support transfer made by the noncustodian (Proposition 4). This however does not
translate into a reduction of single mothers’ utility (see Proposition 6). If, instead, the reform
implies an increase in the custodial parent’s eﬀective wage, then the noncustodian’s transfer
is again likely to decline (Proposition 4). This time, however, such a change can lead to a
strong substitution eﬀect, with single mothers’ increasing their labor supply (Proposition 5).
This and the lower transfer from the nonresident father may lead to a reduction in child welfare
(Propositions 7 and 8), even when there are court-mandated child support orders (Proposition
10) or when low-income parents can choose to behave cooperatively (Proposition 12).
Can our results help us interpret the evidence on unexpected outcomes found in existing
empirical studies? The reduction in single mothers’ utility — which may be driven by lower
marginal income tax rates and/or higher childcare subsidies, as in Propositions 7 and 8 —
could be straightforwardly linked to the evidence of worse parental health reported in Baker
et al. (2008), who examine the eﬀects of the 1997 childcare reform in Quebec. It could also
be related to the estimates shown in Bitler et al. (2005), according to which welfare reform is
associated with decreases in health insurance coverage and health care utilization, as well as
with increases in the likelihood of needing care but ﬁnding it unaﬀordable. Besides issues of
measurement error, the statistically insigniﬁcant association between welfare reform and single
mothers’ self-reported health status in the study by Bitler and colleagues could be the combined
result of changes in both basic beneﬁt levels and eﬀective wages as suggested, for example, by
our Propositions 6 and 7.
Another aspect of child well-being which has relevance in our context is that in-work beneﬁt
reform appears to have led to an increased likelihood of children living with neither parent,
especially in the case of black children (Bitler et al. 2006). This unintended consequence is
important since living with no parent may be a common detrimental outcome for children whose
parents are in jail, deceased, or otherwise unable to care for their children.
Recent empirical research (based both on random-assignment experiments and on nonex-
29perimental data) has found that the eﬀect of welfare and employment policies vary by child
developmental stage (Gennetian et al. 2002, 2005; Michalopoulos et al. 2002; Clark-Kauﬀman
et al. 2003; Morris et al. 2005, 2007; Grogger and Karoly 2005, 2009). Programs that increase
the incentives of parental employment and family income have been generally found to have
negative eﬀects on adolescent children. Most of the same studies, instead, tend to ﬁnd either
neutral or positive eﬀects on pre-school and early-school-age children in low-income house-
holds. Ironically, younger children were typically viewed as most at risk for negative impacts
of maternal employment in many debates that preceded welfare reform. In contrast, however,
other recent studies conﬁrm such concerns, detecting adverse outcomes among very young chil-
dren. For example, Baker et al. (2008) ﬁnd evidence suggesting that children aged 0–4 are
worse oﬀ by measures of aggression, motor and social skills, and illness. Likewise, the results
shown in Herbst and Tekin (2008) indicate that childcare subsidies are associated with negative
developmental outcomes among US children aged 5–6.
Within our model, the reduction in child welfare can have a straightforward interpretation
regardless of developmental stage (Propositions 7 and 8). The model could also provide an
insight into possible diﬀerential age eﬀects, although this heterogeneity is not directly built
into our framework. These might be explained by the possibility that nonresident fathers make
larger transfers when children are younger (Weiss and Willis 1993) and, at the same time,
custodial mothers are less likely to work as opposed to when children are older. Both greater
family income and maternal time can then explain better outcomes of pre-school children. The
unexpected worse outcomes of older children can instead be triggered by reduced child support
payments from noncustodial fathers (lower family income) and mothers’ greater propensity to
work (reduced supervision).
Finally, in-work beneﬁt programs introduced in the UK in the late 1990s have also been
found to have neutral or beneﬁcial eﬀects on self-esteem, happiness and risky behaviors of
children in lone-parent households (Gregg et al. 2009). Some of these heterogenous eﬀects
appear to operate through the sex of the child, with boys experiencing better outcomes and
girls being left with no change or, possibly, worse outcomes. Whether this diﬀerential impact
is, at least in part, the result of greater transfers from nonresidential fathers to their sons than
to their daughters is something that our model does not explain and remains to be documented
empirically.
30Some Pointers for Policy and Future Research
Our analysis suggests that welfare reform, and especially recent work-conditioned transfer pro-
grams, may have unintended consequences among divorced parents and their children. Like
earlier models of child support payments (Weiss and Willis 1985; Flinn and Del Boca 1995;
Flinn 2000), our model also produces ineﬃcient levels of child support transfers and expendi-
tures on children. Additionally, it emphasizes ineﬃciencies related to the childcare decisions
of noncustodial parents. The introduction of generous in-work beneﬁts, which substantially
increase the eﬀective wage of single parents (through either lower marginal income tax rates,
or higher childcare subsidies, or both), may aggravate the ineﬃciency on the custodial side by
creating more incentives to work and thus spending less time with children. This policy-induced
ineﬃciency is magniﬁed by an indirect eﬀect that operates through further reductions of the
already low child support payments made by noncustodial parents.
What are the implications of our results for future in-work beneﬁt reforms? There is con-
sistent and robust evidence that work-conditioned transfer programs around the world have
been quite successful in providing cash assistance to low-income single-parent families without
creating adverse incentives for participation in the labor market (e.g., Hotz and Scholz 2003;
Blundell and Hoynes 2004; Eissa and Hoynes 2004; Morris et al. 2005; Grogger and Karoly
2005; Francesconi and van der Klaauw 2007; Meyer 2007; Blundell et al. 2008). In fact most
studies ﬁnd such programs to produce positive and meaningful increases in labor supply and
total income. However, these positive outcomes notwithstanding, it is unclear whether such
programs actually produce signiﬁcant improvements in the welfare of divorced parents and their
children. As indicated by our theoretical ﬁndings, in-work beneﬁt reforms may in fact have neg-
ative welfare consequences, including that of children. Therefore, in designing welfare-to-work
programs special care should be taken to avoid such eﬀects, for example by including provisions
for improving the availability of higher quality childcare services and through the introduction
of tax incentives or changes in child support orders or in their enforcement to help avoid reduc-
tions in the private child support transfers made by fathers. That is, in-work beneﬁt reforms
ought to be part of a broader mix of family policies.
There are several extensions and applications we would like to pursue in future research.
First, the possibility that divorced parents change their child transfer and expenditure decisions
over time (also in response to changes in welfare programs) suggests that a dynamic model can
provide a more accurate description of ex-spouses’ interactions. Second, some of our rational-
izations rest on noncustodial fathers’ transfer behavior. Although there are several studies that
estimate child support transfer decisions of nonresident fathers (e.g., Weiss and Willis 1993; Del
31Boca and Flinn 1994, 1995; Flinn 2000; Walker and Zhu 2006; Ermisch and Pronzato 2008),
relatively little is known about such decisions in response to welfare reforms. This seems to be
a promising area for future empirical work. Third, formulating an estimable model that could
be taken to longitudinal data on parents and children followed before and after divorce would
enormously enhance our insights into the role of parents in shaping child outcomes and our
understanding of how this relationship can be inﬂuenced by welfare reform.
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35Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We now derive the labor supply decision of the mother for some ﬁxed










Solving for an interior solution, we obtain:
l =
(αm + γm)w − βmδ(B + s)
wδ(αm + βm + γm)
≡ l∗(s) (A.1)
Clearly, l is strictly positive for all s < ˜ s, where ˜ s is given by (11). Under Assumption 1, l < 1 for all
s ∈ [0, ˜ s), making s < ˜ s necessary and suﬃcient for an interior solution. A necessary and suﬃcient
condition for le = 0 is s > ˜ s.




δ(αf + βf) −




We can solve this for an interior solution to obtain:
s =
δ(αf + βf)y − γf(w + δB)
δ(αf + βf + γf)
≡ s∗. (A.2)





Observe also that ˜ s 6 s∗ for all y > y(w), where
y(w) = y(w) +
˜ s(αf + βf + γf)
αf + βf
. (A.4)
Thus, y ∈ (y(w),y(w)) is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an interior equilibrium with se = s∗
and le = l∗(s∗).30 Clearly, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a no-support equilibrium with
se = 0 and le = l∗(0) is y 6 y(w). Finally, a non-employment equilibrium with le = 0 arises whenever
y > y(w). To derive the father’s equilibrium transfer when y > y(w), consider the ﬁrst-order













30Recalling from Assumption 1 that w = δβmB/(αm + γm), it is readily checked that y(w) = y(w).
36Now, if ˜ s 6 s∗ and ˜ s > s, then the father’s utility function is non-decreasing for ˜ s 6 s∗, non-increasing
for ˜ s > s, and therefore maximized by a choice of ˜ s. Conversely, if ˜ s 6 s∗ and s > ˜ s, then the father’s
utility is maximized by a choice of s. Hence for y > y(w) we have le = 0 and se = max{s, ˜ s}.





k, the payoﬀs of the mother and the father are respectively given by
U∗
m = [π∗
x(B + wl∗(s∗) + s∗)]γm[π∗
k(B + wl∗(s∗) + s∗)]αm[1 − δl∗(s∗)]βm (A.5)
and
U∗
f = (y − s∗)γf[π∗
k(B + wl∗(s∗) + s∗)]αf[1 − δl∗(s∗)]βf. (A.6)
First, suppose that the mother chooses to increase child good expenditures according to the as-










and dUm/dπk = 0.
Second, suppose that the mother chooses to decrease labor supply according to the assumption of










x(αm + βm + γm)
w + δ(s∗ + B)
 
< 0
and dUm/dl = 0.
Finally, suppose the father chooses to increase his child support payment according to the assump-







δ(αm + βm + γm)
w + δ(s∗ + B)
 
> 0
and dUf/ds = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. To establish Proposition 4, recall from (A.2) that:
s∗(B,w) =
δ(αf + βf)y − γf(w + δB)
δ(αf + βf + γf)
(A.7)











δ(αf + βf + γf)
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. To prove the proposition, we plug (A.2) into (A.1) and obtain:
l∗(B,w,s∗(B,w)) =
[(αm + γm)w − βmδB]
wδ(αm + βm + γm)
−
βm[δ(αf + βf)y − γf(w + δB)]
wδ(αf + βf + γf)(αm + βm + γm)
. (A.8)
It is now straightforward to establish the proposition by examining the appropriate partial derivatives











βm(αf + βf)(y + B)
w2(αf + βf + γf)(αm + βm + γm)
> 0.
Proof of Propositions 6 to 9. In the interior equilibrium, the utilities of the father and the mother






 βf  








 βm  
w + δ(B + y)
 αm+βm+γm
(A.10)





 b  
w + δ(B + y)
 a+b
where ξc is a positive constant. It is now straightforward to check that an increase in B would (i)
raise the utilities of the father and the mother and (ii) increase child welfare. Proposition 6 follows
immediately.




T 0 ⇔ y S
(αf + γf)w − βfδB
βfδ




T 0 ⇔ y S
(αm + γm)w − βmδB
βmδ
≡ ˜ y(w) (A.12)
∂C∗(·)
∂w
T 0 ⇔ y S
aw − bδB
bδ
≡ ˘ y(w) (A.13)
We ﬁrst note that ˆ y(w) > ˘ y(w) for all γf > 0. Similarly, ˜ y(w) > ˘ y(w) for all γm > 0. Next, recall
that a necessary condition for an interior equilibrium is y > y(w), where y(w) is deﬁned in (A.3).
We can now prove Propositions 7 to 9.
First, if ˆ y(w) 6 y(w) and ˜ y(w) 6 y(w) for all w ∈ (w,w),32 then y > ˆ y(w) and y > ˜ y(w) for
all y > y(w). In this case, the sets (y(w), ˆ y(w)) and (y(w), ˜ y(w)) are empty. As a consequence,
∂U∗
i (·)/∂w < 0 (i = f,m) and ∂C∗(·)/∂w < 0 for all y > y(w). Now, it is straightforward to see that
y(w), ˆ y(w) and ˜ y(w) are linear in w. Next, it is easy to check that ˆ y(w) < y(w) and ˜ y(w) < y(w).
Thus, to have ˆ y(w) 6 y(w) and ˜ y(w) 6 y(w) for all w ∈ (w,w), it is necessary that ˆ y(w) 6 y(w)
and ˜ y(w) 6 y(w). Simple algebra shows that ˆ y(w) 6 y(w) ⇔ γm > γ and ˜ y(w) 6 y(w) ⇔ γf > γ,
where γ ≡ δ(a + b)/[(1 − δ) + δ(a + b)]. Proposition 7 follows immediately.
Next, if γm < γ, then ˆ y(w) > y(w) for all w ∈ (ˆ w,w), where ˆ w = δβfB/αf; similarly, if γf < γ,
then ˜ y(w) > y(w) for all w ∈ (˜ w,w), where ˜ w = βmδB(αf +βf +γf)/[(αm +γm)(αf +βf)−γfβm].
Thus, if γm < γ and γf < γ, the sets (y(w), ˆ y(w)) and (y(w), ˜ y(w)) are non-empty, but inspection
of (A.11) to (A.13) readily reveals that ∂U∗
i (·)/∂w < 0 (i = f,m) and ∂C∗(·)/∂w < 0 for all y >
max{ˆ y(w), ˜ y(w)}. Proposition 8 follows immediately.
31To obtain this, we substitute (A.7) and (A.8), as well as (9), into (A.5) and (A.6), respectively.
32Recall that w = δβmB/(αm + γm) and w = δβmB/[(1 − δ)(αm + γm) − δβm], respectively.
38Finally, it is fairly straightforward, though tedious, to show that if
γf <
(a + b)[δ(αm + βm) − (1 − δ)γm]
(1 − δ)[αm + βm + γm] + (a + b)[δ(αm + βm) − (1 − δ)γm]
, (A.14)
then ˘ y(w) > y(w) for all w ∈ (˘ w,w), where ˘ w = bδB(αf + βf + γf)/[a(αf + βf) − bγf]. To see this,
notice ﬁrst that ˘ y(w) and y(w) are linear in w. Next, it is readily checked that ˘ y(w) < y(w). Thus,
to have ˘ y(w) > y(w) for some w < w, it is necessary that ˘ y(w) > y(w). Equation (A.14) follows
immediately after solving this inequality for γf. In the case where ˘ y(w) > y(w) for all w ∈ (˘ w,w), the
set (y(w), ˘ y(w)) is non-empty, and inspection of (A.11) to (A.13) readily reveals that ∂U∗
i (·)/∂w > 0
(i = f,m) and ∂C∗(·)/∂w > 0 for all y < ˘ y(w). Proposition 9 follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 10. The income threshold above which fathers choose to overcomply with
respect to court orders is given by:
y+(w) =
γf(w + δB) + soδ(αf + βf + γf)
δ(αf + βf)
.







This establishes that an increase in the eﬀective wage of custodial mothers would reduce the set of
fathers who choose to overcomply with child support orders.
Consider now the case in which a father’s income is less than y+(w) but more than y(w). The
utility value of undercompliance is given by
Uun
f (w) = U∗





 βf  
w + δ(B + y)
 αf+βf+γf
while the utility value of exact compliance is
Uex




 βf  
w + δ(B + so)
 αf+βf
where ξe is a positive constant. Now let Σ(w) = Uun
f (w) − Uex
f (w). Deﬁning
κ∗(w) =
(αf + γf)w − βfδ(y + B)
w[w + δ(y + B)]
and κex(w) =
αfw − βfδ(so + B)
w[w + δ(so + B)]
,




f(w) · κ∗(w) − Uex
f (w) · κex(w) > 0
That we have ∂Σ(·)/∂w > 0 uses the fact that U∗
f(w) > Uex
f (w) and κ∗(w) > κex(w) for all
y < y+(w). The fact that an increase in w increases the diﬀerence between the utility values of
undercompliance and exact compliance implies that the set of fathers who choose to exactly comply
with child support orders shrinks.
39Finally, consider the case in which a father’s income is less than y(w). In this case, a father would
voluntarily make no child support payment to the mother, and the corresponding utility value is given
by
Uno
f (w) = U0







 βf  
w + δB
 αf+βf
where ξ0 is a positive constant. Now let Υ(w) = Uno









f(w) · κ0(w) − Uex
f (w) · κex(w) > 0
That we have ∂Υ(·)/∂w > 0 uses the facts that U0
f(w) > Uex
f (w) for all y < y(w) and κ0(w) > κex(w)
for all so > 0. The fact that an increase in w increases the diﬀerence between the utility values of
no child support payment and exact compliance implies that the set of fathers who choose to exactly
comply with child support orders shrinks. Proposition 10 now follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 11. Substituting (A.9) into (18), we obtain:






 β  
w + δ(B + y)
















βδ(y + B) − (α + γ)w
γw[w + δ(y + B)]
 
> 0 for all y > ˆ y(w).
Next, suppose that y < ˆ y(w). Then lc(w) = ℓ(w) and kc = α[wℓ(w) + y + B]/(α + γ), where






w + δ(y + B)
 
< 0
Proposition 11 follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 12. Substituting (A.10) into (19), we obtain:







 β  
w + δ(B + y)
















βδ(y + B) − (α + γ)w
γw[w + δ(y + B)]
 
< 0 for all y > ˆ y(w).
Next, suppose that y < ˆ y(w). Then lc(w) = ℓ(w) and kc = α[wℓ(w) + y + B]/(α + γ), where











w + δ(y + B)
 
= ambiguous
Proposition 12 follows immediately.
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